Abstract: This paper provides evidence that the liquidity of the secondary market for bankers' acceptances increased dramatically during its first 20 years of existence and this increased liquidity lowered the cost of acceptance financing. The Federal Reserve played a key role in the market's development by reducing the risk borne by private dealers and helping to solve coordination problems associated with market entry. The American Acceptance Council also played a pivotal role by using the Acceptance Bulletin to provide important public goods to the market and internalize network externalities. The combined efforts of the Federal Reserve and American Acceptance Council were successful in pushing the discount market to a high-liquidity Nash equilibrium by the late 1920s.
duties as a world banker and should be the aim of all bankers and business men who seek to serve the best interests of commerce and themselves." 3 In 1910 the National Monetary Commission concluded that American money market-a market dominated by commercial paper and call loans on the stock exchange-had two fundamental weakness that could be remedied by the creation of a liquid market for bankers' acceptances. First, American money markets were subject to "most violent oscillations" because call rates were driven by the erratic speculative shifts in the demand for stocks. 4 In contrast,
European money markets were relatively stable because bankers' bills (acceptances) took center stage and their rates were driven by the stable movements in trade. In addition, the free movement of funds between the "great discount markets" in London, Paris, Berlin and
Amsterdam helped to stabilize rates. For the United States, the absence of a liquid market for bankers' acceptances prevented this stability-enhancing arbitrage from taking place:
New York is in a class by itself. Without bank-accepted bills it can have no discount market. Without a discount market funds cannot be moved to it as they do between the financial centers of Europe, because there are no bank-accepted bills in which foreign banks can invest. Our commercial paper is not suitable. Foreign banks will not purchase it because they are not acquainted with or sure of the rating of miscellaneous mercantile establishments and because such paper could not be readily disposed of in case it became necessary or profitable to withdraw funds from New York for remittance elsewhere. 5 Second, the absence of an acceptance market was considered detrimental to the stability of the banking system. Traditionally, local banks with excess funds used them to make deposits at reserve banks, buy bonds or discount commercial paper. It was believed that the system would be less susceptible to banking crises if illiquid commercial paper could be replaced by liquid acceptances on bank balance sheets.
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American Acceptance Council, Acceptance Bulletin, December 1919, p. 2. This paper examines the development of the discount market for bankers' acceptances during its first 20 years. I address three related questions. First, did the capacity and willingness of dealers or "market makers" to provide liquidity to the market expand over time? Second, was liquidity priced? That is, did changes in liquidity affect the cost of acceptance financing? Third, how did institutional innovation affect development of the discount market?
In particular, what role did the Federal Reserve and American Acceptance Council-a trade association comprised of bankers and other investors-play in making the market more liquid?
These questions are important in light of the recent debate about the link between financial development and economic growth. 6 On one side of this debate is the view that "the financial system is an inconsequential side show, responding passively to economic growth and industrialization." 7 On the other is the view that financial development plays an important causal role because it makes credit intermediation more efficient, thus raising the rate capital accumulation and technological diffusion. By examining the institutional development of a specific financial market, we hope to shed light on the causal nature of this process.
To address these issues we focus on bid-ask spreads quoted by dealers and commentary of the market contained in the Acceptance Bulletin and other publications. We provide evidence that acceptance market liquidity increased a great deal between 1917 and 1934 and influenced the cost of financing trade. This development was, in part, an endogenous response to changes in the macroeconomic environment. For instance, increases in economic activity and trade during the 1920s caused the market to become more liquid as increased trading volume lowered the risk borne by potential market makers. Nevertheless, institutional innovations also played an 5 Jacobs, "Bank Acceptances," p. 9. 6 See Levine, "Financial Development." 7 Levine, "Financial Development," p. 689.
important role. First, liberalizations of the rules of the game that governed the market increased trading volume, which reduced dealer risk and encouraged their entry in to market. Second, the Federal Reserve served as the market maker of last resort and further limited the risk borne by private dealers. Finally, the American Acceptance Council provided important public goods by disseminating information about acceptance financing. In addition, they recognized that network externalities were pervasive in the market and attempted to internalize them to increase investor participation beyond the level consistent with narrow self-interest. Both the Federal Reserve and American Acceptance Council played an important role in moving the discount market to a highliquidity Nash equilibrium.
II. Theoretical Issues
Before turning to the data, we address two theoretical questions. First, why were secondary markets more likely to develop for bankers' acceptances than for commercial paper?
Second, what causes secondary market liquidity to change over time? As we discuss below, institutional innovation is crucial for secondary market development when network externalities and multiple Nash equilibria characterize the market.
For a secondary market to develop, dealers must be willing to hold inventories of a security and buy and sell them on a moment's notice. As Demsetz first discussed, these "market makers" provide immediacy (liquidity) services to investors and are compensated by earning the spread between their selling and buying rates. 8 From the investors perspective, the spread between the bid and ask prices represents the round-trip cost of trading and is one dimension of liquidity. A second dimension is market depth, the quantity of securities dealers are willing to buy and sell at their quoted prices. Resiliency, a third dimension of liquidity, is the speed with which prices move back to equilibrium following temporary imbalances between buy and sell orders. In short, a liquid market is one where large orders can be executed with low transaction costs and with little impact on price.
Early theoretical models focused on the inventory control problem facing dealers when buy and sell orders do not arrive synchronously. 9 In this setting, the spread provides the dealer with a source of profit and protects him from failure that occurs when he runs out of cash or securities. These models demonstrated that the dealer's problem had "implications for market viability" and showed "a frailty to the "exchange" process not suggested by previous work." 10 Building on this work, Amihud and Mendelson focused on the link between dealer pricing and inventory evolution. 11 Three important findings emerged. First, as inventories rise (fall) the dealer lowers (increases) both bid and ask prices to return inventories to the desired level. Second, the spread reflects the market power of the dealer and goes to zero with increases in competition. Third, the optimal inventory of securities held by the dealer is determined by the variability of the order flow process.
Subsequent theoretical models focused on the portfolio risk dealers absorbed when making markets. 12 In this setting, the dealer is willing to accommodate traders by holding a portfolio with large concentrations of particular securities and the bid-ask spread compensates him for the costs associated with holding undiversified portfolios. These costs take two main forms. The first is the holding cost that arises because undiversified portfolios expose dealers to greater asset price risk. The second arises when there is asymmetric information and dealers face the possibility they will trade with investors who are more knowledgeable about the security. When either of these costs change, competitive forces induce dealers to alter the price they charge for providing liquidity services-the bid-ask spread. If the costs become prohibitive, dealers are unwilling to make the market.
These models help us understand why secondary markets are more likely to develop for some assets than others. 13 Consider the case of international trade that requires financing because the exporter requires immediate payment and the importer is unable to make payment until the goods are transported and sold in the domestic market. One option for the importer is to obtain a loan by having a bank discount their commercial paper. Another option is to seek acceptance financing. In this case, a bank that is familiar with the importing firm promises to accept a time draft (an order to pay a specific amount of money at a specific time) drawn on it by the importer. Once the bank stamps "accepted" on the draft it becomes its unconditional liability. At this time the bank discounts the draft and the importer uses the funds to pay the exporter. The importer repays the bank once the goods are sold.
After the bank has accepted the time draft it has two options. If the bank holds the acceptance in portfolio, it is making a loan to the importer much like it is with commercial paper.
In contrast, if the bank sells (rediscounts) the acceptance in the discount market it is substituting its credit for that of the importer, enabling the importer to borrow from others. In this case, the bank is only providing its guarantee and is not lending money. On or before the maturity date, the importer pays the bank the face value of the acceptance. If the bank had rediscounted the acceptance in the secondary market, it pays the holder the face value when it matures. The bank
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Stoll, "The Theory of Dealer Services."
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Although our understanding of market microstructure has advanced a great deal in the past three decades, economists working at the start of the twentieth century had a keen sense that a key difference between commercial paper and bankers' acceptances was their liquidity: "What is vital, however, is that with a national discount market an investment in a bank-accepted bill is one which could be realized upon immediately. Commercial paper and assumes the primary liability in this case-if the importer is unable to make payment, the bank must payoff the acceptance holder. 14 Thus one key difference between commercial paper and bankers' acceptances was the standardization of credit quality and this explains why secondary markets were more viable in the latter case. 15 The heterogeneous credit quality of "one-name" (commercial) paper raises dealer inventory holding costs because they need to hold many names in their portfolios to satisfy investors with different preferences for credit risk and to reduce their own risk exposure.
When these costs become prohibitive, dealers are unwilling to make the market. In contrast,
gradations of credit quality are much smaller for "two-name" paper such as acceptances because the number of accepting banks are relatively small and they are more transparent. As a result, dealers needed to hold relatively limited selections of acceptances. 16 Moreover, dealers would need to charge a large spread to protect themselves from the risk of trading with informed traders in commercial paper. As Glosten and Milgrom show, a "lemons problem" created by this information asymmetry can lead to situations where there is no bid-ask spread that allows dealers to break even and, as a consequence, the secondary market ceases to function. 17 Information is more symmetric for bankers' acceptances because a relatively small group of large banks hold the primary liability.
bank acceptances are both discountable. The prime difference between them, as affecting the country bank, is that they are not both readily rediscountable." Jacobs, "Bank Acceptances," p. 16.
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The importer assumes the secondary liability: if the bank becomes insolvent and is unable to pay off the holder of the acceptance, the importer must do so. If the exporter draws the draft on the bank, the exporter rather than the importer assumes the secondary liability.
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For an excellent discussion of this issue see Melton and Mahr, "Bankers' Acceptances." 16 Given the need to diversify, acceptances dealers have traditionally held much larger inventories (relative to the flow of purchases and sales) than have dealers in even more homogeneous securities such as Treasury bills. For example, in the 1980s the ratio of dealer positions to transactions in acceptances was about 1.5, compared to a ratio of about 0.35 for Treasury bills. To offset these high costs, acceptance dealers have charged a wider spread between bid and ask rates. For example, in the 1980s the bid-ask spread charged on acceptances was about four times that charged on Treasury bills (see Melton and Mahr, "Bankers' Acceptances") .
Market microstructure models also explain how changes in the macroeconomic environment affect the willingness of dealers to supply liquidity over time. One of the key determinants of liquidity is trading volume. As balanced trading volume increases, the dealer's holding period decreases because he is better able to reverse positions with offsetting buy and sell orders.
18 This decreases dealer risk exposure and competitive forces lead to lower bid-ask spreads. Economies of scale can also play a role: increases in balanced transaction volume raise profits (for a given spread) and this induces market entry that drives the bid-ask spread down.
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Because dealers are compensated for bearing risk, higher interest rate volatility also leads to higher spreads. Increases in interest rate levels, such as produced by tighter monetary policy, raise inventory financing costs that may be passed through to the spread. Finally, increases in dealer risk aversion or decreases in their wealth-such as might occur during a financial crisiscan lead to higher spreads.
The preceding discussion suggests that both trading volume and asset price volatility exert an exogenous and independent influence on market liquidity. However, Pagano has shown that trading volume and price volatility may interact with one another. On the one hand, "thin" markets (low trading volume) lead to increases in price volatility because a low number of transactions per unit of time causes prices to be more sensitive to the demand shocks of individual traders (shocks tend to cancel out when markets are "thick"). On the other hand, price volatility affects trading volume. As price volatility rises, dealers raise bid-ask spreads and investors respond to the higher transaction costs by trading less. In this setting each additional trader generates a positive externality for other (actual or potential) traders. As traders enter, trading volume rises and the market becomes more liquid. This benefits other traders who value
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This point is emphasized by Tinic, "The Economics of Liquidity Services."
liquidity and security issuers who now face a lower cost of capital. If many agent choose to trade, the market is characterized by "greater price stability and absorbative capacity." However, a potential coordination problem exists because "individual investors may have no incentive to enter the market although as a group they would benefit from entry." 20 Pagano shows that these interaction effects can produce markets with multiple steadystate equilibrium, some characterized by low volume and high price volatility and others by high volume and low price volatility. Expectations held by potential market participants play a key role in determining which equilibrium the market converges to. If transaction costs are currently high and expectations are based solely on history, market thinness and illiquidity become selfperpetuating. That is, the market "remains trapped in a low-trade, high-variance Nash equilibrium, and the opinion of outsiders about thinness and riskiness of that market will be confirmed by the facts." 21 If, on the other hand, participants expect that market thickness will increase in the future, positive feedback effects become operative and the high-liquidity equilibrium is reached.
One implication of this insight is that shocks to trading volume can be highly persistent if they move the market to a new equilibrium. In addition, as I argue below, the presence of network externalities helps to explain the role of the Federal Reserve and American Acceptance
Council in the market's development: many of their activities were undertaken to shift the market to a superior Nash equilibrium.
III. Growth of the Acceptance Business
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This mechanism is emphasized by Shen, "Bid-Ask Spreads." 20 Pagano, "Endogenous Market Thinness," p. 270. 21 Pagano, "Endogenous Market Thinness," p. 270.
At the outset, there were numerous restrictions on the types of economic activity that acceptances could finance, the volume that banks could create, the maturity of these credits, and who could purchase them. For instance, the Federal Reserve Act passed December 20, 1913, gave National Banks permission to create acceptances only for United States imports and exports. Apparently, a period of learning was needed before unfettered markets could be trusted to work well:
The freedom of action and permissive exercise of good judgment-without set rules and regulations-which had always been a privilege of the London bankers, was not considered prudent in the United States, at least not until the thirty thousand banks in and outside the Federal Reserve System had mastered the technique of bankers' acceptance credits.
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By 1917 the Act had been amended several times and banks were allowed to create acceptances for other purposes including: a) the shipment of goods within the United States (Domestic Shipment), b) the storage of marketable staples in independent warehouses (Warehouse Credits), c) the creation of dollar exchange for banks in specified countries (Dollar Exchange), and d) to finance trade between and storage of goods in foreign counties (Foreign Shipment and Storage). The rules of the game were further liberalized in 1919 when the Act was amended so that member banks could accept up to 100 percent of their capital rather than 50 percent originally mandated. In 1921, the Reserve Banks were allowed to purchase six-month import and export acceptances (up from 90 days). In 1926, the American Acceptance Council helped get legislation passed in New York that made it legal for life insurance companies to invest in acceptances.
As Figure 1 shows, the volume of bankers' acceptances outstanding expanded rapidly To help support the nascent market, the Reserve Banks were given the power to rediscount "eligible" acceptances offered by dealers and accepting banks. The Reserve Banks did so by posting buying rates for prime acceptances and purchasing all eligible acceptances offered at those rates. Figure 1 suggests that the Federal Reserve provided strong support to the market in the first decade with over one-half of outstanding acceptances often held by the Reserve Banks. In contrast, the Reserve Banks held less than one-sixth of acceptances by 1929 as they withdrew from the market. As one observer noted, "The mothering by the Federal Reserve Banks had accomplished its purpose. Investors were taking over the burden of moving the constantly increasing volume of bills and the market prospered accordingly." 26 Figure 1 also reveals that acceptances outstanding followed a pronounced seasonal cycle related to agriculture. Typically, acceptances outstanding rose between August and December as crops were moved and then fell during the winter and spring months. As acceptances issuance rose, market rates on acceptances began to increase relative to rates set by the Reserve Banks.
Investors responded by rediscounting acceptances at the Reserve Banks and, as a consequence, the stock held by the Reserve Banks also displayed a strong seasonal pattern (see Figure 1 ). This policy rule also caused market rates to fluctuate around the rate set by the Reserve Banks (see Figure 3) . During periods of declining trade, market rates on acceptances fell as few new acceptances were issued. In some periods (e.g., 1922, 1924, 1932 and 1933) 
IV. Development of the Discount Market
How did the discount market develop during its first 20 years? Is there evidence that liquidity changed over time or that the market shifted between different equilibria? If so, why?
To address these questions, we focus on bid-ask spreads quoted by acceptances dealers and commentary by contemporary observers. Figure 4 shows weekly spreads between buying and selling rates set by dealers for acceptances with 30, 90, 120 and 180 days to maturity.
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At the outset there were no "specially organized dealers" who understood the "details of making acceptances and the selling arguments" or had the expertise "for acquiring and disposing of a great volume of bankers' acceptances daily…" 28 Dealers financed inventory holdings by borrowing funds in the call market and using the acceptances held in inventory as collateral. The rates charged on the loans averaged about 50 basis points below the call loan renewal rate, and were generally slightly less than the bid rate for thirty-day acceptances. 31 As the call rate rose, so did the cost of financing inventory holdings and dealers responded by raising bid and ask rates to shrink inventories, thus transmitting changes in the call rate to acceptance rates.
Despite the emergence of a cadre of dealers in 1918 and 1919, the historical record indicates that the market was dependent on the Reserve Banks:
As the history of the early years of the American Acceptance business is now reviewed, it is seen that the Reserve Bank's active interest and support was the salvation of the inadequate market which then existed.
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Additionally, the historical record clearly identifies the problem facing private dealers and the solution offered by the Federal Reserve:
It is true that for several years the dealers were obliged to depend rather heavily on the Reserve Banks. Excessive portfolios had to be carried at a rate below the cost of money in the open market. The offer of the Federal Reserve Banks to carry dealers' bills under a repurchase agreement was and still is a favorable influence. Without it, portfolios would have, of necessity, been kept at not more than day to day requirements.
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Low trading volume increased dealer risk exposure and made it difficult for them to "live off the spread." By engaging in repurchase agreements at below-market rates, the Reserve Banks acted as the market maker of last resort and reduced the risk borne by private dealers. 34 Dealers responded by carrying larger inventories and supplying liquidity services to the discount market.
One interpretation the Federal Reserve's behavior is that they were attempting the push the market to a superior Nash Equilibrium. If they could induce market entry by raising the return to participation, they could create an expectation of future market thickness and liquidity that might become self-perpetuating.
The behavior of the bid-ask spreads in Figure 4 suggests that the market shifted between low-and high-liquidity equilibria. To see this, consider the three years from 1917 to 1919. The high spreads at the outset likely reflected monopoly markups and high risk facing dealers. As discussed above, the nascent market had few dealers so those that entered were rewarded by high spreads. Moreover, the low number of acceptances outstanding in 1917 and early 1918 meant that trading volume was probably low and dealers faced high holding costs.
Low levels of wealth and unfamiliarity with the market could have also made dealers less willing and able to bear risk. Liberalization of the rules governing the market and economic expansion contributed to rapid growth of acceptances outstanding in late 1918 and 1919. As transaction volume rose, dealer risk fell and profits increased. New dealers entered the market, spreads decreased and the market shifted to a high-liquidity equilibrium by 1919.
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From the Reserve Banks' perspective, the repurchase agreements insured that their transaction volume was balanced. That is, purchases were automatically matched by subsequent sales.
Beginning in late 1919 the market shifted back to a low-liquidity equilibrium with spreads rising to ¼ of one point on many occasions during the next three years. Several different shocks seem to have played a role. First, monetary policy tightened in December 1919 and this raised the cost of financing inventories. Note the high values for the call rate shown in Figure 5 .A. Second, the volatility of interest rates rose as well. This is seen in Figure 5 .B, which shows the conditional standard deviation of the call rate estimated using a standard firstorder GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic) model. To the extent that dealers are compensated for bearing risk, it is not surprising to observe an increase in bid- The ease with which $800,000,000 in bankers acceptances are handled by the discount houses and dealers who constitute the 'Exchange' in the Acceptance Market, shows conclusively that we now have a real discount market with sufficient capacity to absorb and distribute prime bankers acceptances to a still further increased volume. American Acceptance Council, Acceptance Bulletin, June 1924, p. 14. 37 Fry, "The Future," p. 9.
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For example, Fleming has shown that there was considerable variation of U.S. Treasury yields around fitted term structure curves in late 1998 and he attributes this to a breakdown in arbitrage caused by more illiquid secondary markets. Fleming, "The Benchmark." 39 Report issued by the American Acceptance Council as quoted in Thralls, "The American Discount Market," p. 5.
Apparently, improvements in the fundamentals helped shift the market to a high-liquidity equilibrium.
To stem stock market speculation, the Fed raised the discount rate in a series of steps beginning February 3, 1928 Very seldom does the bill market come to the standstill condition of the past two weeks… Heretofore there has been an ebb and flow of bills that has kept the wheels moving but on this occasion nearly all the bills are in the Federal Reserve Banks and as the Federal Reserve buys from but never sells to the market the total bill volume is therefore locked up to be held to maturity.
40
While illiquidity was reflected in higher bid-ask spreads at the long end of the market (spreads on 120-and 180-day bills remained at ¼ of one point between October 16, 1931 and January 8, 1932) , spreads for 30-and 90-day acceptances rose to ¼ for only one week in October.
The preceding discussion suggests that the discount market shifted between low-and high-liquidity equilibria between 1917 and 1934. By the late 1920s, it appears that the short-end of the market had converged to a stable high-liquidity equilibrium and was resilient to changes in the macro environment that should have lowered liquidity.
Several factors explain the shift. First, various changes in the rules of the game, along with increases in international trade, raised trading volume that created positive feedback that helped propel the market to a high-liquidity equilibrium. Second, Federal Reserve support to the market helped solve the coordination problem and induce market entry. Third, there was a steady increase in the concentration of acceptance business during the first 20 years and the increase in credit standardization that this brought about must have lowered the risks borne by dealers and encouraged them to make the market. In the early days there were more than 500 accepting banks and the 40 most active created about 50 percent of outstanding acceptances. By the end of 1934 only 112 banks were creating acceptances and the top 40 accounted for about 95 percent of acceptances. 42 West, Banking Reform, p. 54. Quoted in Roberts, "Quis Custodiet, " p. 589. 43 Specifically, the stated purpose of the American Acceptance Council was to conduct "a nationwide educational campaign designed to inform the business people and bankers as to the merits of trade and bankers acceptances, the method of their use in foreign and domestic merchandising, and for the further purpose of aiding in the establishment of a comprehensive open discount market, and to assist in other matters that will improve the credit system and strengthen the financial position of America." (American Acceptance Council, Acceptance Bulletin, June 1919, p. 1.) monthly basis starting in June 1919. The Bulletin contained a "Question and Answers" column as well as numerous articles written by market practitioners.
There is also evidence that the Council recognized the presence of network externalities and used the Bulletin as a tool to push the market to a superior Nash equilibrium. · "After using the trade acceptance for more than a year we realize more fully its importance and value, and we shall be very glad to see the day when it will be universally used.
" [American Coffee Company of New Orleans]
Why did the Bulletin publish these testimonials? One explanation is that they were trying to manage expectations and convince potential market participants of future market growth. Given the spatial separation of markets, new information that acceptances were being used extensively in New England, for example, might convince those in the south that future trading volume would be high. For similar reasons, each month the Bulletin published the "First Forty," a ranking of the top 40 accepting banks. To the extent that banks valued the prestige associated with a high ranking, they might be induced to create a greater volume of acceptances and help move the market to the socially efficient level, i.e., the level that took into account the positive externalities that occur when more trades raise market liquidity.
Finally, in addition to self-interest and prestige, the Bulletin appealed to the participant's sense of duty:
There can be no question of the duty of the big banks in the large centers… nevertheless, their [smaller banks'] duty as well as their profit lies in the direction of carrying as a secondary reserve acceptances of American banks.
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Moreover, cooperation was considered essential:
It is obvious that for banks doing a large acceptance business, it is a duty as well as a dictate of self interest to buy acceptances… The discount market cannot develop unless everybody co-operates; accepting banks as well as non-accepting banks.
45
Admonitions such as these appeared repeatedly in the Bulletin and reflect an appreciation for the role of network externalities. If the Bulletin could internalize the positive externalities created when an investors entered the market, they could move the market to a superior equilibrium.
V. Regression Models for the Spread
A central tenant of this paper is that bid-ask spreads compensated dealers for bearing risk. In addition, we argued that the short-end of the acceptance market shifted to a high-liquidity Nash equilibrium and liquidity provision became less sensitive to changes in fundamentals in the late 1920s. To formally test these propositions, I examine whether the movements in the spreads can be explained by fluctuations in interest rate risk using simple regression models. If the market became more resilient in the late 1920s, the spreads should have been less responsive to changes in interest rate risk .
The regression models for the bid-ask spread include three explanatory variables: a) the level of the call loan rate (CALL), b) the conditional standard deviation of changes in the call rate (CALLSD), and c) month-of-year dummy variables. 46 As discussed above, the call rate measures the cost of financing inventories and should exert a positive influence on the spread.
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American Acceptance Council, Acceptance Bulletin, July 1919, p. 4. 45 American Acceptance Council, Acceptance Bulletin, April 1920, p. 1.
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The dummy variables are for the months from January to November. December, which typically has the highest level of acceptances outstanding, is reflected in the constant term.
The standard deviation of the call rate provides a measure of return risk borne by dealers and should be positively related to spreads. Because data for weekly trading volume is not available, I test for volume effects by examining the explanatory power of the month dummies: if trading volume and bid-ask spreads are inversely related then spreads should rise during winter and summer months when crop movement (and trading volume) slows down. Table 1 provides results for regressions estimated using the full sample. The coefficients on call rate volatility are positive and significantly different from zero in five of the six regressions. Moreover, the coefficients are three to four times larger in regressions for the long-term (120 to 180 day) acceptances. This finding makes sense because short-term acceptances had a longer history, were self-liquidating, and subject to less price risk.
In addition, Reserve Bank rediscounting of acceptances with maturities of 90 days or less
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Data was first reported for rates on 120-, 150-and 180-day acceptances in, respectively, 1922, 1923 and 1924. truncated dealer risk at the short end. Overall, these results support the hypothesis that the spreads reflected perceptions about interest rate risk. 
VI. Liquidity and the Cost of Capital
Did changes in liquidity affect the level of acceptance rates? 48 If investors value the ability to buy and sell large quantities of acceptances with low transaction costs, then the bid-ask spreads and level of acceptance rates should be positively related. To formally examine this hypothesis, we regress weekly changes in acceptance rates on: a) the level of the acceptance rate The results are reported in Table 3 . Coefficients on the lagged acceptance rate are negative in all six regressions, but only marginally significant. Thus there is weak evidence of mean-reversion. In contrast, the Federal Reserve discount rate has a positive and highly significant impact on the acceptance rate as expected. The coefficients on the month dummies
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There is considerable empirical evidence from the post-WWII period that liquidity affects asset prices (see Amihud and Mendelson , "Asset Pricing" and "Liquidity, Maturity;" Kamara, "Liquidity, Taxes;" and Shen and Starr, "Liquidity of the Treasury Bill Market").
(not shown) are generally negative and often significantly different from zero (the April dummy often takes on the largest negative value). Thus the acceptance rate tends to fall in months when fewer acceptances were created. Most importantly, the bid-ask spread has a positive and statistically significant impact on the acceptance rate for maturities of 90 days and less. While coefficients on the spread for longer-term rates are positive, they are not statistically significant.
Thus there is evidence linking liquidity and interest rates. This finding is important because it suggests the financial development and has real effects.
VII. Conclusion
The liquidity of the secondary market for bankers' acceptances increased a great deal during its first 20 years. Part of the increase was an endogenous response to economic growth and the expansion of international trade. As more acceptances were issued and traded, the risk borne by dealers declined and they entered the market. However, important institutional changes also caused the market to deepen and become more resilient. Liberalization of the rules of the game made it easier for economic agents to issue and hold acceptances and this reduced dealer risk by expanding trading volume. Power given to the Reserve Banks to rediscount acceptances allowed them to act as the market maker of last resort and this further strengthened the discount market. Finally, the American Acceptance Council played a key role by providing important public goods (education) to the market and using the Bulletin to internalize network externality.
The combined efforts of the Federal Reserve and American Acceptance Council were successful in pushing the discount market to a high-liquidity Nash equilibrium by the late 1920s. These efforts had paid off handsomely: acceptances outstanding reached all time highs, and the United
States had become one of the world's bankers. In addition, the development of a liquid discount market for bankers' acceptances in the United States increased the efficiency of the financial system and lowered the cost of trading. Significance at 10, five and one percent levels denoted by *, **, *** respectively. Significance at 10, five and one percent levels denoted by *, **, *** respectively. Maturity of Bankers' Acceptances BA(T-1) is the level of the bankers' acceptance rate lagged one week; DISRATED is the weekly change in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's discount rate; and SPREAD is the difference between the bid and ask rate for bankers' acceptances.
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